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States' Right to Confine "Not Guilty
by Reason of Insanity" Acquittees
after Foucha v. Louisiana
INTRODUCION
Ever since the now famous M'Naghten's Case' set the basis for
insanity as a defense to a criminal conviction, the disposition of those
found "not guilty by reason of insanity" ("NGRI")2 has been a center of
controversy. While states are generally free to determine whether, and to
what extent, mental illness should excuse criminal behavior,3 the United
States Supreme Court has never clearly articulated the states' right to
indefinitely confine defendants found NGRI in mental institutions or
hospitals. The Court has repeatedly recognized that "civil commitment for
any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires
due process protection." 4 Consequently, a state must have a
constitutionally adequate purpose for such confinement.' Further, the
Court has recognized that a finding of guilt in the commission of a crime
' M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). In 1843, Daniel M'Naghten shot and
killed Edward Drummond, the secretary to the British prime minister. After pleading not
guilty and claiming that he was suffering from paranoid delusions that the prime minister
and the pope were conspiring against him, M'Naghten was found "not guilty by reason
of insanity." On appeal, the House of Lords put forth five hypothetical questions to the
common law judges concerning the tying of persons who have committed crimes while
suffering from insane delusions. The judges' answers to these questions have become the
basis for the modem insanity defense in most jurisdictions.
2 Various names and acronyms are used to designate those defendants relieved of
criminal responsibility on the basis of the insanity defense, including insanity acquittee
and ABRI ("Acquittee By Reason of Insanity"). For purposes of convenience, the
acronym NGRI ("Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity") will be used throughout the
remainder of this Note.
3 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. CL 1780, 1790 (1992) (O'Connor, 3., concurring). For
an example of a state statute governing the effect of mental illness on criminal culpability,
see IDAHO CODE § 18-207(a) (1987) ("Mental condition shall not be a defense to any
charge of criminal conduct.").
4 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715 (1972).
' See O'Connorv. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 (1975); Jones v. United States, 463
U.S. 354, 361 (1983).
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indicates dangerousness,6 which justifies the automatic commitment of
the defendant by a state.7 However, the permissible length of such
confinement and the standards governing the release of an NGRI
acquittee that states may impose remained a mystery until the Supreme
Court's holding in Jones v. United States.!
In Jones, the Supreme Court upheld against due process challenges
a District of Columbia statute that required automatic commitment of
those found NGRI. Specifically, the Court held that NGRI acquittees
confined to a mental hospital need not be released merely because they
have been hospitalized for a period longer than they might have served
had they been convicted of the crime.9 The Court held that the District
of Columbia's statutory scheme, which required proof of insanity based
on a preponderance of the evidence, followed by automatic commitment
of the NGRI acquittee, comported with due process. The Court based this
holding on the rationale that the defendant's commission of a crime
constitutes an adequate basis for hospitalizing him as a dangerous and
mentally ill person." Further, the fact that the defendant has dommitted
a criminal act justifies treating him differently than a person confined
through civil commitment proceedings." After Jones, states appeared to
be free to confine NGRI acquittees "indefinitely.v
12
Some scholars have criticized the Jones decision as limiting the
rights and due process protections afforded to NGRI acquittees."3 As
a pre-emptive counter to such an argument, the Court in Jones put
forth the proposition that "the Due Process clause does not require
Congress [or the states] to make classifications that fit every
individual with the same degree of relevance."' 4 Thus, it is
constitutionally permissible for the states to treat criminal and civil
committees differently in some respects. 5
6 See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 714 (1962); Jones, 463 U.S. at 364.
7 Jones, 463 U.S. at 364.
' 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
9 Id. at 368-69.
I Id. at 363-64.
n See id at 367.
12 Thomas J. Brophy, Comment, Jones v. United States: Indefinite Confinement of
Insanity Acquittees, 10 NEW ENG. J. ON CRM. & CIv. CoFD ETqrr 405, 423-31 (1984).
13 See SAMUEL J. BRAKEL Hr AL., THE MEmALLY DIsALED AND THE LAW, 726-29
(3d ed. 1985); Sarah AlderIs Brown, Note, Constitutional Law-Criminal Procedure Due
Process and Release From Indefinite Confinement Following Acquittal By Reason of
Insanity: Jones v. United States, 32 KAN. L. REv. 843 (1984); Brophy, supra note 12.
14 Jones, 463 U.S. at 366.
15 Id. at 370.
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In 1992, in its first major pronouncement regarding the states'
right to confine NGRI acquittees since Jones, the Supreme Court
struck down a Louisiana statutory provision regarding the release of
NGRI acquittees. In Foucha v. Louisiana,6 the Court struck down
a Louisiana statute that allowed for continued confinement of an
NGRI acquittee based on "dangerousness" alone, without a showing
of present mental illness." The Court held that when one of the
bases for the original confinement no longer exists,"0 due process
entitles the NGRI acquittee to constitutionally adequate procedures for
either granting his release or determining the basis for his
confinement." In addition, a plurality of the Court held that the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from treating NGRI acquittees
differently from persons subject to civil commitment. 0
While the Foucha holding may have revived some procedural due
process protections that were taken away by Jones, it leaves the states
in a myriad of confusion respecting their right to confine an NGRI
acquittee. This Note examines the states' right to confine NGRI
acquittees in light of the Foucha holding. Part I describes the
Louisiana statutory scheme and outlines the Court's opinion in
Foucha.Y Part II critically analyzes the Court's holding in Foucha
by comparing Foucha to Jones and pointing out the flaws in the
Foucha Court's reasoning.' Part II also examines the appropriate
standard of review for the Court in such confinement cases.z3 Part
Im seeks to determine the current state of the law in this area and the
status of other state statutes similar to that of Louisiana. 4 This Note
concludes that the Court's decision in Foucha is logically unsound,
leaving the law in the area of confinement of NGRI acquittees even
more unclear than it was before Jones. Until the Supreme Court
makes another pronouncement in this area, the puzzling picture
painted by Jones and Foucha leaves the following question
unanswered: What is the states' right to confine an NGRI acquittee?
16 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
17 Id. at 1785.
" In Foucha, mental illness was the basis for the original confinement and the
defendant was subsequently determined to be in '"good shape' mentally." Id. at 1782.
'9 Id. at 1785.
20 See id at 1788-89.
' See infra notes 25-82 and accompanying text.
= See infra notes 83-144 and accompanying text.
2' See infra notes 145-66 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 167-218 and accompanying text.
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I. FOUCHA v. LOUISIANA
A. Statutory Scheme
The Louisiana statute regarding the insanity defense follows the
traditional "right or wrong!' M'Naghten test.' In Louisiana, a person
charged with a crime who seeks to claim insanity must enter a dual plea
of "not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity."' 6 Such a dual plea
first requires the jury to determine that the defendant has committed the
crime before turning to the issue of his or her sanity.' The defendant
must then prove his or her insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence!' In addition, Louisiana law permits the court to adjudicate the
NGRI defendant without a trial if there exists a sufficient factual basis for
doing so.'
"' LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 (West 1986) ("If the circumstances indicate that
because of a mental disease or mental defect the offender was incapable of distinguishing
between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question, the offender shall be
exempt from criminal responsibility."). For a good description of the major variants to the
insanity defense in the United States, see ALAN A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW.
A SYSTEM IN TRANSiTON 228-30 (1975); BRAKEL Er AL., supra note 13, at 709-12.
The MNaghten test remains in force, in its original form, in about one-third of the states.
See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 12.47.010(a) (1990); AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(A) (1989);
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-101 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 401(a) (1987); FLA. R. CRIM.
P. ANN. 3.217 (West 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2 (1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.4 (West
Supp. 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.026 (West 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 194.010 (1991);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-5102 (Michie 1986) (Judicial
Volume J-3); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152(4) (West 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
314(d) (1983); S.D. CODIED LAWS ANN. § 22-1-2(24) (1988); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01
(West Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.12.010(1)(b) (West 1989). In a few other
states, the test is only slightly modified by statute or case law. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-1
(1982) (Commentary: "irresistible impulse" test).
2 LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 552(3) (West 1981).
See State v. Marmillion, 339 So. 2d 788, 796 (La. 1976).
LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 652 (West 1993). This should be distinguished from
an alternative plea in which the defendant claims that he is either not guilty or not guilty by
reason of insanity, thus placing the burden on the prosecution to prove his sanity. In Louisiana,
once the prosecution has proven the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if the
defendant does not prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, he is automatically
found guilty. See State v. Clark, 305 So. 2d 457,463 (La. 1974); Harry J. Philips, Jr., Comment,
The Insanity Defense in Louisiana: Presumpilons, Burden of Proof and Appellate Review, 42
LA. L. REv. 1166, 1172 (1982).
29 LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 558.1 (West Supp. 1991) ("The court may
adjudicate a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity without trial, when the district
attorney consents and the court makes a finding based upon expert testimony that there
is a factual basis for the plea.").
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If a defendant is found NGRI, he or she is automatically committed
to a mental institution." Upon commitment, the acquittee is entitled to
a prompt hearing in order to determine whether he or she can be
released." If the defendant meets the burden of proof at this hearing, he
or she is either discharged or released on probation; otherwise, he or she
is committed indeterminately to a proper mental institution. 2  After
commitment the acquittee is entitled, upon request, to another release
hearing in six months and at yearly intervals thereafter.3 The acquittee
may be granted additional release hearings upon recommendation by the
superintendent of the mental institution.' At each release hearing, a
review panel is appointed to examine the acquittee and report on whether
the acquittee can be safely discharged." The burden at all release
hearings is on the committed person "to prove that he can be discharged,
or can be released on probation, without danger to others or to
himself."' Thus, the Louisiana statutory scheme allows continued
confinement of an NGRI acquittee based on a single finding of
"dangerousness," without an examination into the acquittee's present
mental condition. This standard was recently upheld against constitutional
challenge by the Louisiana Supreme Court.'
B. Facts of the Case
Terry Foucha was arrested for committing aggravated burglary of an
inhabited dwelling while armed with a .357 revolver." He was subsequently
charged with violating Louisiana Revised Statute sections 14:60" and
30 LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 654 (West 1986).
31 Id. ("Tihe court... shall promptly hold a contradictory hearing at which the defendant
shall have the burden of proof, to determine whether the defendant can be discharged or can
be released on probation, without danger to others or to himself.").
32 Id.
3LA. CODE CRM PRoc. ANN. art. 655(B) (West Supp. 1993).
34LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 655(A), 656 (West Supp. 1993).
3s LA. CODE CRILM. PROC. ANN. art 656 (West Supp. 1993). The panel would consist of
the members of the original sanity commission, if available. Id. The acquittee may also retain
his own physician for an examination, as well Id.
36 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West Supp. 1993).
' State v. Perez 563 So. 2d 841, 845 (La. 1990), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 2320 (1992);
State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138, 1144 (La. 1990), revd, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
31 Foucha, 563 So. 2d at 1138.
" LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:60(1) (West 1986) provides in part: "Aggravated burglary
is the unauthorized entering of any inhabited dwelling, or of any structure, water craft, or
movable where a person is present with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein, if
the offender ... [i]s armed with a dangerous weapon... :'
1993-94]
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14:94.40 Foucha entered the dual plea of "not guilty and not guilty by
reason of insanity" and the trial court appointed two experts to ascertain
his sanity4 ' Although the court initially found Foucha incompetent to
stand trial, four months later, he was found competent to proceed.42 On
October 12, 1984, the court found Foucha "not guilty by reason of
insanity" and ordered his immediate commitment to the Feliciana
Forensic Facility at Jackson, Louisiana.4 On June 11, 1987, Foucha
requested, and the superintendent of the facility recommended, that he be
granted a release hearing." Although the panel of doctors appointed by
the court initially recommended Foucha's release, the trial court found
that he was a danger to others and ordered him recommitted. 45 The court
apparently relied heavily upon a doctor's testimony indicating that Foucha
had an "antisocial personality" and had been involved in several
altercations at the facility." Thus, Foucha had not satisfied the burden
of proof under article 657 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
that he was no longer a danger to others or to himselff
On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the decision denying
Foucha's release.4 Specifically, the court upheld the Louisiana release
proceedings against Equal Protection and Due Process Clause challenges.
As to the Equal Protection Clause argument, the court held that "the
differences in Louisiana procedure reflect justifiable distinctions between
persons civilly committed and persons found not guilty by reason of
40 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:94 (West 1986) provides in part: "Illegal use of
weapons or dangerous instrumentalities is the intentional or criminally negligent
discharging of any firearm, or the throwing, placing, or other use of any article, liquid,
or substance, where it is foreseeable that it may result in death or great bodily harm to
a human being."
41 Foucha, 563 So. 2d at 1139.
42 Id.
43 Id.
"Id.
41 Id. at 1140. This was in accordance with the Louisiana statutory scheme. See supra
note 29.
"6 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1782 (1992).
4LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:2(3), (4) (West 1989) provide, respectively, that:
"Dangerous to others" means the condition of a person whose behavior or
significant threats support a reasonable expectation that there is a substantial
risk that he will inflict physical harm upon another person in the near future.
"Dangerous to self' means the condition of a person whose behavior,
significant threats or inaction supports a reasonable expectation that there is a
substantial risk that he will inflict physical or severe emotional harm upon his
own person.
" State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138 (La. 1990), rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 1780 (1992).
[Vol. 82
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insanity. 49  Consequently, there was no unjustified discrimination
against Foucha. In a footnote, the Court stated that the United States
Supreme Court's previous holding in Jones v. United States5" was not
dispositive of the issue in this case for two reasons. First, the Court in
Jones was concerned with the specific question of whether due process
requires the release of the acquittee when he has been confined for a
period of time longer than he would have served in prison had he been
convicted,5 rather than with the issue of whether it is constitutionally
permissible to continually confine an NGRI acquittee based on
"dangerousness" alone. Second, any statements questioning the
"dangerousness" standard in Jones were based merely on the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the District of Columbia's statutes and have no
constitutional significance in other contexts. 2
As to the Due Process Clause argument, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that due process is a flexible standard and that "the protection of
society and defendant are constitutionally adequate purposes for
continuing [the] defendant's confinement."53 Thus, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by finding that Foucha had not met the burden of
proving that he was no longer a danger to others or to himself 4
C. The United States Supreme Court Opinion
The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari and
reversed the holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court.5 In a 5-4
decision, the Supreme Court held that the continued confinement of an
NGRI acquittee based on the standard of "dangerousness" alone is
unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.' In addressing the due process
question, the majority' first noted that a state may commit a defendant
automatically once it has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence
49 Id. at 1144.
'0 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
"' Foucha, 563 So. 2d at 1141 n.11.
2 Id.
n Id. at1144.
4 Id.
" Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
See id
Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion, was joined by Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, O'Connor and Sourter. There were two dissenting opinions: one written by Justice
Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) and the other by Justice
Thomas (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia).
1993-941
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that the defendant is "not guilty by reason of insanity ' because, from
such a finding, one can infer that the defendant is still mentally ill and
dangerous." The Court then relied on Jones v. United Statesf and
O'Connor v. Donaldson6' for the proposition that the "committed
acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no
longer dangerous ... i.e. the acquittee may be held as long as he is both
mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer."
The Court enunciated three propositions to counter the state's
contention that "dangerousness" alone justified continued confinement.
First, keeping Foucha against his will in a mental institution absent a
determination in a civil proceeding of current mental illness and
dangerousness was impermissible.' Second, since Foucha could no
longer be held as an insanity acquittee (since he was no longer insane),
Jackson v. Indiana" entitled Foucha to constitutionally adequate
procedures to justify his confinement.' Third, due process protects an
individual's liberty from bodily restraint such that the potentially
"indefinite" confinement of Foucha was a wrongful, arbitrary
governmental action." Although the Court did note that in some cases
a state may confine an individual against his or her will, such detention
must be strictly limited in duration to be constitutionally permissible.'
A plurality' of the Court also held that the Louisiana statutes violated
the Equal Protection Clause." While the Court acknowledged that Jones and
other cases have held that treating NGRI acquittees differently in some
respects from those persons subject to civil commitment is not a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause, that was not the issue in Foucha.0 Since
Foucha was no longer insane, he could no longer be treated as an NGRI
" See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1783.
"Id.
463 U.S. 354 (1983).
"422 U.S. 563 (1975) (holding that it is umconstitutional to confine a mentally ill
person who is harmless).
" Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1784 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
&Id.
' 406 U.S. 715 (1972); see also infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text
(distinguishing Jackson from Foucha).
6s Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1785.
6See id
6See d at 1787.
"Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1787 (White, J., joined by Blackmun, Stevens, and Sourer,
Id. at 1780, 1788.
7Id.
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acquittee. Thus, Louisiana was now discriminating against Foucha in that,
unlike sane criminal defendants who cannot prove their
nondangerousness7e ' or insane civil committees;. Louisiana permitted
Foucha to be confined based on dangerousness alone. The Court stated
that, absent a "particularly convincing reason," the state's discrimination
against NGRI acquittees was unconstitutional.73 This discrimination was
based on treating Foucha differently than two similar groups: (1) civil
committees and (2) other dangerous but sane criminals.
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated her belief that the
facts of this case did not require reaching the equal protection issue.74
Justice O'Connor's purpose for writing a separate concurrence was to
emphasize four important points left unclear by the majority opinion.
First, she noted that by this decision, the Court was only striking down
the specific statutory scheme of Louisiana 5 The Court was not passing
judgment on other narrowly drawn laws that provide for the confinement
of NGRI acquittees based upon different standards." Second, O'Connor
did not interpret the Court's holding to mean that Louisiana could never
confine dangerous NGRI acquittees once they regained their mental
health.' In her opinion, a more narrowly drawn statute tailored to reflect
pressing safety concerns related to the acquittee's dangerousness, like that
at issue in United States v. Salerno," would survive a due process
challenge.79 Third, O'Connor interpreted the majority's holding as not
placing any new restrictions on the states' freedom to determine whether,
and to what extent, mental illness should excuse criminal
responsibility.' States remain free to formulate their own insanity
' Id. But compare WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODEN CRaMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1988),
noting that "[i]t is thus apparent that the insanity defense serves a unique purpose ....
[TIhe general assumption seems to be that the defense makes it possible to separate out
for special treatment certain persons who would otherwise be subjected to the usual penal
sanctions which may follow conviction." Id. at 371 nI2.
72 Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1788; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28:96(C), :96.1(B),
:97 (1989) (dealing with the discharge of civil committees).
7Foucia, 112 S. Ct. at 1788.
-' Id. at 1790 (O'Connor, J., concunring).
7' Id. at 1789.
76Id.
Id.
7 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding the Bail Reform Act of 1984 that provided for
limited pretrial detention of dangerous felony arrestees); see also infra notes 187-92 and
accompanying text (distinguishing Saleno from Foucha).
' See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
go Id. at 1790.
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defense or even to abolish the defense entirely.81 Finally, Justice
O'Connor stated that, even under the majority's analysis, statutes based on
the "dangerousness" standard alone which are limited to the maximum
duration of criminal confinement would not necessarily be
unconstitutional.'
II. ANALYSIS OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PRocEss
CLAUSES IN CRIMINAL CONFINEMENT CASES
A. Equal Protection Clause
The right of the states to treat NGRI acquittees differently from
persons subject to civil commitment proceedings was unclear until Jones
v. United States.3 The Jones Court ruled that there is no constitutional
requirement to release an NGRI acquittee at the end of his hypothetical
maximum sentence and subject him to civil commitment proceedings.8
Likewise, requiring a lower standard of proof at the criminal commitment
proceeding than is required at the civil proceedings is not
unconstitutional. 5 The rationale behind the Jones decision is that NGRI
acquittees and civil committees represent two distinct classes of persons.
The NGRI acquittee's commission of a criminal act places him or her in
a special class that should 'be treated differently for purposes of
commitment.s'
In Foucha v. Louisiana,"I the Supreme Court reversed its previous
position by striking down the Louisiana statute as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause.' Relying on Jones, the Court agreed that NGRI
acquittees may be treated differently for equal protection purposes.
However, because Foucha was no longer insane, he could no longer be
classified as insane.89 Thus, it would appear that the Foucha Court
"t See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-207(a) -(Michie 1987) (abolishing the insanity
defense).
See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1790 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For an example of such
a state statute, see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.77.020(3), .110(1) (1990).
463 U.S. 354 (1983).
u Id. at 368-69.
S' ee id at 367-68.
'7Id. at 370.
112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
88 Id. at 1788. However, it is important to note that this part of the Court's opinion
commanded only a four vote plurality. Justice O'Connor, who joined the majority result,
believed that it was unnecessary to reach the equal protection issue on the facts of this
case. Id. at 1789.
9 Id. at 1788.
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believed that once the insanity that had allowed for different treatment
between classes at commitment hearings no longer existed, the state could
no longer treat such persons differently for purposes of release hearings.
This position, however, is inconsistent with the holdings of several circuit
courts of appeals." Prior to the Foucha holding, neither the Supreme
Court nor any other court had ever made the distinction between release
proceedings and commitment proceedings for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause. An examination of some of these cases shows
substantial support for the proposition that the Foucha Court
invalidated-that NGRI acquittees and civil committees can be treated
differently at release proceedings.9'
In Glatz v. Kor, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals examined
Colorado's criminal commitment and release proceedings against Due
Process and Equal Protection Clause challenges. The court held that it
was not a due process violation to automatically commit an NGRI
acquittee, thus denying him certain procedures afforded to a civil
committee." The court, relying on Jones, made a similar holding with
respect to the release proceedings. The court stated that if the Due
Process Clause does not require the same procedural safeguards for NGRI
acquittees, "then there necessarily is a rational basis for equal protection
purposes for distinguishing between civil commitment and commitment
-' United States v. LaFromboise, 836 F.2d 1149, 1151 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding
Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act); Glatz v. Kort, 807 F.2d 1514, 1517-18 (10th Cir.
1986) (upholding Colorado's release proceedings); Benham v. Ledbetter, 785 F.2d 1480,
1488 (1lth Cir. 1986) (upholding Georgia's release proceedings); Hickey v. Morris, 722
F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding Washington statute).
' But see Francois v. Henderson, 850 F.2d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating in dicta
that the Louisiana release proceeding is unconstitutional); Jackson v. Foti, 670 F.2d 516,
522 (5th Cir. Unit A March 1982) (requiring substantially the same protections for
insanity acquittees as granted to civil committees); Reome v. Levine, 692 F. Supp. 1046,
1053 (D. Minn. 1988) (finding that confinement on a constitutionally adequate ground
cannot continue when the ground ceases to exist); State v. Murphy, 760 P.2d 280, 286
(Utah 1988) (finding that in the absence of mental illness, dangerous propensity is not an
appropriate justification for continuing involuntary commitment).
• 807 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1986).
9' See id. at 1517-18. An argument challenging the differences in proceedings
between criminal and civil committees, although based on the Due Process Clause, is
essentially an Equal Protection Clause challenge. 'This, of course, is an equal protection
argument (there being no rational distinction between A and B, the State must treat them
the same) ... :' Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1800 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 375 n.5 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (finding no differences inthe forms of relief available under the two theories).
1993-941
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of insanity acquittees."' 4 Thus, the court did not make the distinction
between commitment and release proceedings that the Foucha Court
made.
Similarly, in Benham v. Ledbetter,5 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, on remand from the Supreme Court in light of the holding in
Jones,96 upheld Georgia's release proceedings for NGRI acquittees. The
court decided that the fact that the NGRI acquittee had committed a crime
justified treating him or her differently from the civil committee.' Other
circuit courts of appeals9 and state supreme courts99 also agree with
94 Glatz, 807 F.2d at 1522 (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 362 n.10). The Glatz court
also noted that:
Insanity acquittees and involuntary civil committees are not similarly situated
groups for equal protection purposes. As noted, the insanity acquittee has
confessed to committing a criminal act earlier and the grand jury or the court
has found probable cause to believe that he did in fact commit the act. It is not
unreasonable to conclude that an insanity acquittal supports an inference of
continuing mental illness.
Id. (citation omitted).
95 785 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1986).
96 Benham v. Edwards, 678 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 463 U.S. 1222 (1983).
See Ledbetter, 785 F.2d at 1488. The court explained in detail the similarity
between equal protection and due process when applied to mental health commitment as
follows:
If the release requirements for insanity acquittees do not violate due process
guarantees, they are necessarily rationally based on permissible goals. On the
other hand, if the scheme fails due process analysis, no number of other rational
purposes can save it. Therefore, where due process is implicated, an equal
protection challenge essentially restates the claim that the legislature has
infringed a liberty interest. An equal protection challenge in which no due
process claim is alleged "stands on its own" as the class notes, but it also must
bear the heavy burden of demonstrating the lack of a rational basis for treating
civil committees and insanity acquittees differently after the requirements of due
process have been met.
Id. at 1485 n.4 (citations omitted).
"See United States v. LaFromboise, 836 F.2d 1149, 1151 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding
the Federal Insanity Defense Reform Act, which places the burden on an NGRI acquittee
to prove that he/she does not pose a substantial risk of bodily injury or serious property
damage in order to be released); Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1983)
(upholding a Washington statute that places the burden on the NGRI acquittee to prove
fitness in order to be released prior to the time period of the maximum penal term of the
crime charged).
9' See People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040, 1053 (Colo. 1981) (stating that actual
adjudication as to the insanity of an acquittee will have taken place prior to commitment);
Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 138 (Me. 1971) (stating that procedural differences arise
from a court determination of not guilty by reason of insanity), overruled on other
grounds, Taylor v. Comm'rof Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 481 A.2d 139 (Me.
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the making of such distinctions between NGRI acquittees and civil
committees.
In holding that equal protection becomes a relevant inquiry once the
basis for treating the two classes differently no longer exists, the Supreme
Court in Foucha disregarded this background and persuasive
authority." As a result, the Foucha Court's conclusion does not flow
logically from previous cases in which the differences in the commitment
proceedings and in the burden of proof at these proceedings were held to
be based on the NGRI acquittee's dangerousness and prior criminal
conduct. 1 ' Justice Thomas, in his Foucha dissent, stated that the
Court's disregard for the NGRI acquittee's past conduct was unwise in
that, unlike civil committees, NGRI acquittees have committed a criminal
act.' °2 He stated that this "real and legitimate distinction between
insanity acquittees and civil committees ... justifie[d] procedural
disparities." '' Justice Thomas' point is well taken. The dangerousness
and criminal activity that serve as a justification for treating an NGRI
acquittee differently before commitment should not be disregarded at the
release proceedings merely because the acquittee is no longer mentally ill.
The plurality's reliance in Foucha on the acquittee's current sanity is
unsound in another respect. By definition, a criminal defendant found
"not guilty by reason of insanity" is not necessarily insane at the time of
1984).
" See Foucha v. Louisiana, -112 S. Ct. 1780, 1788 (1992). In fact, the Court's
majority opinion made no mention of prior decisions of the United States courts of
appeals. Id. at 1780-84.
101 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 367-68 (1983) (finding that there is no
reason to adopt the same standard of proof for the two proceedings); Williams v. Wallis,
734 F.2d 1434, 1437 (11th Cir. 1984) (finding that differences inrelease procedures based
on dangerousness are constitutional); Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 1983)
(finding that since the defendant proved his insanity, he should be required to prove his
recovery); Powell v. Florida, 579 F.2d 324, 333 & n.15 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding that
release of insanity acquittees should be detennined by looking to continuing
dangerousness); Chavez, 629 P.2d at 1052-53 (finding that differences in the treatment of
insanity acquittees is supported by the defendant's assertion of the insanity, the probable
cause determination, and the insanity adjudication).
" Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1800 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
10"3 Id. Justice Thomas also noted that, "[while a State may renounce a punitive
interest by offering an insanity defense, it does not follow that, once the acquittee's sanity
is 'restored,' the State is required to ignore his criminal act, and to renounce all interest
in protecting society from him." Id. at 1801; see also id. at 1804 n.l (reiterating a belief
that the two classes are different even after sanity has been restored); Id. at 1807
(stressing the importance of the prior adjudication and the finding of the commission of
crimes by these acquittees).
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trial.'" Rather, the defendant is claiming that his or her insanity at the
time of the offense, some time in the past, was the reason for his or
her criminal conduct. 5 With the defense of incompetency to stand
trial, in contrast, the issue is the defendant's sanity at the time of trial.
Thus, the distinguishing aspect between the insanity defense and the
defense of incompetency to stand trial is the particular point in time
at which the defendant's sanity is at issue."ss
Under Louisiana's statutory scheme, a defendant found NGRI is
automatically committed to a mental institution. 7 There is no
adjudication of the defendant's sanity at the time of trial. A finding
of NGRI means that the defendant has committed all of the elements
of the crime but is merely exempt from criminal responsibility
because of his or her insanity at the time of the offense.s
Therefore, the NGRI acquittee's confinement is based on his or her
dangerousness and criminal acts, not on his or her insanity at the time
of trial. 9
'o But see infra note 109 (noting a presumption of continuing insanity for purposes
of commitment).
101 See BRAKEL Er AL., supra note 13, at 694.
"0 9 Id. The Supreme Court had previously noted the differences between the NGRI
acquittee and the defendant incompetent to stand trial in Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354 (1983):
The proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the acquittee committed a criminal
act distinguishes this case from Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), in
which the Court held that a person found incompetent to stand trial could not
be committed indefinitely solely on the finding of incompetency. In Jacison,
there was never any affirmative proof that the accused had committed criminal
acts or was otherwise dangerous.
Id. at 364 nA2.
107 LA. CODE CRiM. PRoc. ANN. art. 654 (West Supp. 1993).
'0 State v. Clark, 305 So. 2d 457, 461 (La. 1974) (Barham, J., dissenting).
109 There is, however, a continuing presumption of insanity at the time of trial. See
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983) (quoting S. REP. No. 1170, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 13 (1955), which stated a presumption of continuing insanity); Glatz v. Kort,
807 F.2d 1514, 1522 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding that it is not unreasonable to conclude that
an insanity acquittal supports an inference of continuing mental illness). One commentator
has recognized three justifications for the commitment of an NGRI acquittee who is
presently sane. First, by raising the insanity defense, the defendant has voluntarily
accepted commitment. Second, a presumption of "continuing" insanity exists for a
reasonable time after the defense is raised. Thrd, the insanity defense is a privilege that
society awards to excuse the defendant from the consequences of his criminal act. Robert
Greenwald, Disposition of the Insane Defendant After "Acquittal"-The Long Road from
Commitment to Release, 59 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 583, 584 (1968).
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The Foucha Court's reliance on the NGRI acquittee's sanity at the
time of release, when it was not initially a consideration at the time of the
acquittee's commitment, is troubling. The state's interest in treating NGRI
acquittees differently does not disappear the instant that the acquittee
becomes "sane." n1 Nonetheless, under the Court's current analysis, a
"sane" NGRI acquittee can be treated differently from a civil committee
at commitment hearings, but not at release proceedings. While this
approach to treatment would be appropriate for a defendant found
incompetent to stand trial, its application to the NGRI acquittee is
illogical
111
B. Due Process Clause
The Supreme Court has long held that "civil commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection."' 2 It is little wonder, then, that the issue of due process comes
up frequently in the area of criminal confinement since many states and the
federal government allow for automatic commitment of defendants upon a
verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity."" 3 The usual rationale behind
such automatic commitment is that the defendant insanity at the time of the
offense, once established, is presumed to continue through the trial. 4 The
Supreme Court's seminal pronouncement in the area of mental health
confinement was Jackson v. Indiana."5
.. Fouha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1801 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
. Although this part of the Court's decision commanded only a four-vote plurality,
it raises questions concerning the Court'spurported rationale for treating NGRI acquittees
differently than civil committees in the first place. The error in the Court's logic stems
from a confusion of the procedural aspects of the insanity defense. This error weakens the
precedential value of Foucha for criminal release proceeding cases. One can only
speculate as to the use of this logic by the current Supreme Court to strike down other
schemes which provide for different release proceedings for criminal and civil
committees.
.. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
" See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4243(a) (1988); UNIF. LAW CoMMissIoNER's MODEL
INSANrIY DEFENSE AND POST-TRiAL DIsposrTON Acr § 902(2) (1984); 11 U.LA. 204
(Supp. 1992); AREZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3994 (West 1989); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-
105(4) (1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(1) (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(1)
(Supp. 1992); LA. CODE CRaL Poc. ANN. art. 654 (West Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 103 (West 1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:8-b (Supp. 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(1) (West
Supp. 1992).
1 See cases cited supra note 109.
15 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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In Jackson, the Court considered the due process claims of the
petitioner, a deaf mute charged with robbery who, after being found
incompetent to stand trial, was subject to automatic commitment under
Indiana law."6 Because two psychiatrists testified that Jackson would
never regain competency, he was not entitled to release and was, in
effect, subject to "indefinite" confinement.1 7 In striking down the
Indiana procedures as a violation of the Due Process Clause, the Court
stated in a now famous passage, that "[a]t the least, due process requires
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation
to the purpose for which the individual is committed."' . Since Jackson
had not been found guilty of committing any crime, the state did not
possess an interest sufficient to justify confining him indefinitely."9
A similar issue came before the Court in Jones v. United States.
In Jones, the Court held that an NGRI acquittee need not be released or
subjected to civil commitment proceedings merely because he is nearing
the end of his hypothetical maximum sentence.' The Court recognized
that a state must have "a constitutionally adequate purpose for the
confinement,"'' but stated that Jones' continuing mental illness and
dangerousness justified denying his release."2 In a footnote, the Court
specifically distinguished Jones' situation from that of Jackson. In
Jackson, "there was never any affirmative proof that [the defendant] had
committed criminal acts or otherwise was dangerous."'' In Jones, on
the other hand, there was "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" that Jones
had committed the criminal act."z Therefore, the due process claims of
the NGRI acquittee are distinguishable from that of the civil committee.
116 Id. at 717-19.
117 Id. at 719.
"' Id. at 738.
119 Specifically, the Court held:
[A] person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely
on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the
reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable fiture. If it is
determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the
customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit
indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant.
Id.
'20 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
'21 Id. at 369.
2Id. at 361 (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574 (1975)).
123 See id at 369.
'4 Id. at 364 n.12.
12s Id.
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In spite of this distinction previously made between the NGRI acquittee
and the civil committee, the Foucha Court held that continued confinement
of the NGRI acquittee violates due process where the NGRI acquittee is no
longer mentally ill.12 One possible explanation for the Court!s apparent
change of position is its reliance on Jones for the proposition that "the
acquittee may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but
no longer."127 However, it is unclear whether that proposition was the
actual holding of the Jones court or mere dicta or simply an interpretation of
the District of Columbia's statutory scheme for release. As to whether or not
it was mere dicta, the Jones Court specifically stated in a footnote that it was
not asked to decide whether the District of Columbia release procedures
were constitutional.' The real issue before the Court in Jones was whether
an NGRI acquittee must be released when he or she has been confined for a
period longer than he or she might have served in prison if convicted."
Thus, to the extent that Jones did not address the District of Columbia's
release proceedings, any statements addressing when anNGRI acquittee must
be released could be viewed as dicta.
The second interpretation of the Jones decision-that Jones merely
interpreted the District of Columbia's statutory scheme for release--is only
expressed in Benham v. Ledbetter."' In upholding Georgia's release
proceedings for NGRI acquittees, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was
very critical of the Jones decision. The Benham court noted that Jones only
dealt with the NGRI acquittee's original commitment, not his or her
release."' The court also noted that "[b]ecause the Jones rationales are
directed only to the automatic commitment in the District of Columbia...
[they] must be used cautiously in analyzing Georgia's procedures for releasing
n See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (1992).
1 Id.
m Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 n.l (1983); see also Reese v. United
States, 614 A.2d 506, 514 (D.C. 1992) (construing the same statute that was" at issue in
Jones. and stating that the Jones Court had not addressed the constitutionality of the
release provisions).
Jones, 463 U.S. at 354. Many courts relying on Jones have noted the Court's actual
holding. See Benham v. Iedbetter, 785 F.2d 1480, 1484 (11th Cir. 1986) (counseling
cautious use of Jones due to its limited holding); Glatz v. Kort, 807 F.2d 1514, 1519
(10th Cir. 1986) (stating that Jones did not address allocation of the burden of proof at
release proceedings); Williams v. Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434, 1439 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating
that Jones did not address the burden of proof at release proceedings); Hickey v. Morris,
722 F.2d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that Jones had not directly addressed
procedures for review and release of NGRI acquittees).
10 Benham, 785 F.2d at 1484.
131 Id.
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insanity acquittees."" Like the Benham court, the Louisiana Supreme
Court, in upholding Fouchat continued confinement, refused to attach
constitutional significance to the Jones holding 33 Thus, depending on
whether or not the proposition from Jones can be viewed as constitutionally
significant; the Foucha courtt reliance on it may be misplaced.
A second possible explanation for the Foucha Court apparent change of
position may be a confusion as to the standards for civil and criminal
confinement. Justice Kennedy, in his Foucha dissent, correctly pointed out
that Foucha was a criminal case and that under the Louisiana statutory
scheme, the dual plea of "not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity"
ensures that the burden remains on the state to prove all elements of the
crime."  Thus, the state had already met the rigorous burden of "proof
beyond a reasonable doubt."'" Kennedy also noted that the state'
satisfaction of its burden of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" is what
distinguishes Jones from JacAson v. Indiana." Therefore, Justice Kennedy
believed that the Foucha majoritys reliance on civil cases such as O'Connor
v. Donaldson37 and Addington v. Texasm" was unwise.39 Kennedy
accused the majority of"conflating" the standards between criminal and civil
commitment and, in effect, overruling a principal part of Jones."
Whether or not the Foucha Court actually overruled Jones depends
on what the holding of Jones actually was. Justice Kennedy recognized,
however, that the majority of the Court in Foucha, to some extent,
confused the distinctions between criminal and civil cases. The
132 Id.
3 See State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138, 1141-42 nl1 (La. 1990) (stating that the
Jones Court had not considered the constitutionality of a dangerousness test for continued
detention), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992). The United States Supreme Court, however,
stated that "[t]he court below was in error in characterizing the above language from
Jones as merely an interpretation of the pertinent statutory law in the District of Columbia
and as having no constitutional significance." Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. CL 1780, 1784
(1992).
. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1792 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also State v. Clark, 305
So. 2d 457, 461 (La. 1974) (Barharn, J., dissenting) (stating that the dual plea of ,not
guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity" still requires the state to prove that the
defendant committed the crime).
"' Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1792 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1807 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (stating that NGRI acquittees stand in a different posture than persons who
have not been found to have committed a criminal act).
'36Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1792 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
.. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
"9 See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1793 (Kennedy, 3., dissenting).
14 Id.
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rationale for holding a civil committee has always been the state's
'"parens patriae power to protect and provide for an ill
individual.' ' 4' As a result, many civil commitment statutes condition
initial commitment on present insanity and a concurrent finding of
dangerousness to self and/or others. 42 On the other hand, the
rationale for criminal commitment is usually to ensure public
safety. 4 1 In Jones, the Supreme Court had previously recognized
that there is a difference between those defendants who have been
found to have committed a criminal act and those who have not.'"
There is no reason for the Court now to hold that, just because an
NGRI acquittee has become "sane," he or she should be treated as a
civil committee. The state, having met its burden of proving all
elements of the crime "beyond a reasonable doubt," should be
justified in treating the NGRI acquittee differently than a civil
committee. Determinations regarding the Due Process Clause should
not vary on such erratic circumstances.
C. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court has never bpen entirely precise as to what the
standard of review is in mental health confinement cases such as
141 Id. at 1794; see also BRAKEL Er AL., supra note 13, at 24 (stating that the state
has the power to act for the protection of those who cannot care for themselves); Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736 (1972) (stating that states have traditionally had broad
powers to commit the mentally ill); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975)
(Burger, C.L, concurring) (noting that "the States are vested with the historic parens
patfiae power, including the duty to protect 'persons under legal disabilities to act for
themselves"') (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972)).
4, See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:54 (West Supp. 1993) ("The respondent is
suffering from serious mental illness which contributes or causes him to be dangerous to
himself or others, .. ."); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (Michie/Bobbs-Menill 1991)
('No person shall be involuntarily hospitalized unless such person is a mentally ill person
(1) Who presents a danger or threat of danger to self, family or others as a result of the
mental illness; .. -).
'43 Foucha, 112 S. CL at 1794 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Id. at 1806 (IThomas,
J., dissenting) (stressing the long-standing belief that the states' interest in confinement
of the dangerous mentally ill is legitimate); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366
(1983) (stating that the state has an important interest in automatic confinement); Phelps
v. United States, 831 F.2d 897, 898 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding the dangerousness test to be
a familiar one); Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding a substantial
state interest in preventing early release of the dangerous).
A Jones, 463 U.S. at 364 n.12; see also Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364, 375-76
(D.C. 1981), ajf'd 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (stating that Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972), was not applicable to the case at bar because Jackson was not tried for a crime).
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Foucha where there are equal protection and due process
challenges." The Foucha Court, for example, did not define the
standard of review used in evaluating the due process and equal
protection challenges to the Louisiana statutory scheme.'" Although
Justice Thomas accused the majority of incorrectly applying a "strict
scrutiny" standard, 47 even Thomas did not reveal what the
appropriate standard should be because he felt that the Louisiana
statutes under attack were "reasonable.""' Justice O'Connor, in her
concurrence, simply stated that the Louisiana legislature was
deserving of some judicial deference.' In order for the states to
determine the extent of their right, if any, to continually confine an
NGRI acquittee, the states must have some understanding of what
standard of review a court will apply to their statutory schemes.
The case containing the best analysis of the appropriate standard
of review in mental health confinement cases is Hickey v. Morris.'"'
In Hickey, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the three
Supreme Court cases in this area' as applying a "rational basis"
test.' The Hickey court also noted that recent decisions applying
the Equal Protection Clause in different contexts had applied the
"rational basis" test with a sha-per focus-a so-called "heightened
scrutiny" test.' In Hickey, however, the court refused to define
which was the correct standard because the statute in question
satisfied both the "rational basis" and "heightened scrutiny" tests."M
'4s Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1807 n.15 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
146 It is again important to note that in the area of mental health confinement, there
is essentially no difference between challenges based on the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses. The basic argument is that, there being no rational distinction between
A and B, the state must treat them the same. For a good explanation of how the
constitutional challenge is formulated, see Benham v. Ledbetter, 785 F.2d 1480, 1485 n.4
(11th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 93, 97.
147 See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1807-08 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas'
accusation is apparently based on the majority's statement that "[ftreedom from physical
restraint being a fundamental right, the State must have aparicularly convincing reason,
which it has not put forward, for such discrimination against insanity acquittees who are
no longer mentally ill." Id. at 1788.
141 Id. at 1807 n.15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Hickey, 722 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1983).
1.. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972);
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
1- Hickey, 722 F.2d at 545-46.
15 Id.
154 Id.
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An examination of equal protection challenges in other contexts
reveals that "strict scrutiny" is an inappropriate standard of review in
mental health confinement cases.55 In the absence of either a suspect
classification or an intrusion on a fundamental right, the traditional
standard of review requires that the challenged classification "bear some
rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.""ls Since suspect
classifications are generally thought of as those based on nationality or
race," those confined to a mental institution would not constitute a
suspect class. Furthermore, even though the Court has recognized that
confinement to a mental institution constitutes a significant deprivation
of liberty,5  an NGRI acquittee should not enjoy a fundamental right
to unrestricted liberty based upon that adjudication. A "liberty interest"
is not synonymous with a "fundamental right" to be free from
confinement.5 ' Under statutory schemes such as those found in
Louisiana, a defendant found NGRI has committed all of the elements of
the crime, but is exempt from criminal responsibility because of his or
her mental state. Thus, it is not unreasonable to confine him or her to a
mental institution.'" In fact, other states, similar to Louisiana, provide
for automatic commitment upon a finding of NGRI.'6 Therefore, it
would make little sense to hold that such an acquittee enjoys a
"fundamental right" to be free from confinement in a mental
institution. 16
Several lower level courts agree that "rational basis" is the
appropriate standard of review in mental health confinement cases. 63
" However, at least one commentator has advocated use of a "strict scrutiny"
standard in reviewing challenges to the continued confinement of the civilly committed
and the NGRI acquittee. See Barry Kirschner, Constitutional Standards for Release of the
Civilly Committed and Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity: A Strict Scrutiny Analysis, 20
ARIZ. L. REV. 233, 236 (1978).
" San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973), reh'g denied,
411 U.S. 959 (1973).
7 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
... See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
'" See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1805 & n.12 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
" See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (discussing how automatic
commitment of NGRI acquittees comports with equal protection).
161 See sources cited supra note 113.
'"See People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040, 1052 n.22 (Colo. 1981).
'"See United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Lee v. Kolb, 449
F. Supp. 1368, 1381 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Chavez, 629 P.2d at 1052; Mills v. State, 256
A.2d 752, 756 (DeL 1969); People v. Larson, 478 N.E.2d 439, 444 (111. App. Ct. 1985);
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Even the Supreme Court in Jones alluded to "rational basis" as being the
appropriate standard. 4  While many courts have hinted that a
"heightened scrutiny" standard-one that falls between "rational basis" and
"strict scrutiny-is appropriate," no court has taken the initiative in
applying such a standard.'" Thus, in the absence of a clear
pronouncement by the Supreme Court, one can conclude that the "rational
basis" test is applicable in cases of this nature.
III. CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW
In striking down the Louisiana statute, the Foucha Court, relying on
Jones, held that "the acquittee may be held as long as he is both mentally
ill and dangerous, but no longer.""16 The Louisiana statute is not
unique, however, in allowing for continued confinement of the NGRI
acquittee based solely on his or her "dangerousness."" Eight other
states currently have statutes similar to that of Louisiana which allow for
continued confinement based on "dangerousness" alone.
169
Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 138 (Me. 1971), overruled on other groundr, Taylor v.
Comm'r of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 481 A.2d 139 (Me. 1984).
,64 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 n.10 (1983).
165 See United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. died, 111
S. Ct. 1591 (1991); Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1983); People v.
Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040, 1051 n.21 (Colo. 1981); see also The Supreme Court, 1992
Term-Leacing Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 218-20 (1992) (advocating a
'reasonableness" scrutiny standard).
1" Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, US file (August 15, 1993).
167 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (1992).
"a6 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West Supp. 1991) ("At the hearing the
burden shall be on the committed to prove that he can be discharged, or can be released
on probation, without danger to others or to himself.").
9 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §403(b) (1987) (acquittee shall be kept
institutionalized until the court "is satisfied that the public safety will not be endangered
by his release"); HAW. REv. STAT. § 704-415 (1985) (insanity acquittee may be released
ifthe court is satisfied that the release can be granted "without danger to the committed
... or to the person or property of others"); IOWA R. CiUm. P. 21.8(e) (West 1992) ("If;
upon hearing, the court finds that the defendant is not mentally ill and no longer
dangerous to the defendant's self or others, the court shall order the defendant released.")
(emphasis added); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(3) (Supp. 1991) ("If the court finds the
committed person is no longer likely to cause harm to self or others, the court shall order
the person discharged."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-301(3) (1991) (insanity acquittee
not entitled to release until he proves that he "may safely be released"); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:4-9 (West 1982) (insanity acquittee not entitled to release or discharge until the
court is satisfied that lie is not a "danger to himself or others"); WAsH. REV. CODE §
10.77.200(2) (1990) (insanity acquittee not entitled to release until he proves that he "may
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The "dangerousness" standard for confinement of NGRI acquittees
had been upheld by other courts prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Foucha7 ° In Hickey v. Morris,7' for example, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld Washington's release procedures against equal
protection and due process challenges. The court held that Jones was not
dispositive of the issue at hand and noted that "the state has a substantial
interest in avoiding premature release of persons who have already proved
their dangerousness to society."'" The court held that the
"dangerousness" standard was constitutionally permissible because it was
reasonable for the state to require proof that the NGRI acquittee no longer
presents a danger to society. Thus, under a "rational basis" test, the
statute survived constitutional challenge. 74
A few state courts have also upheld the "dangerousness" standard. In
State v. Mahone,"  the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that
"dangerousness" bears a "reasonable relation" to the purposes for which
finally be discharged without substantial danger to other persons, and without presenting
a substantial likelihood of committing felonious acts jeopardizing public safety or
security"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(4)(d) (West Supp. 1992) ("court shall grant
[release] unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person would pose a
significant risk of bodily harm to himself or herself or to others or of serious property
damage"). Also, three states recently amended their statutes to change from the
"dangerousness" standard to one involving an inquiry into the acquittee's present mental
state. See CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1026.2 (West Supp. 1992) (effective Jan. 1, 1994);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-268.1(i) (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 19:2-181 (Michie 1990)
(effective July 1, 1992).
The majority of the Court in Foucha criticized Justice Thomas' reliance on some of
these statutes because the Court believed that the Supreme Courts of New Jersey and
Delaware had given their respective statutes different constructions. Foucha, 112 S. Ct
at 1787 n.6. However, the Court erred in this interpretation. The New Jersey Supreme
Court merely gave a strict construction to "dangerousness" by requiring a "substantial risk
of dangerous conduct within the reasonably foreseeable future." See State v. Fields, 390
A.2d 574, 586 (N.J. 1978). In a subsequent opinion addressing the constitutionality of the
Delaware statute, the Delaware Supreme Court was merely quoting dicta from Mills v.
State, 256 A.2d 752, 757 n.4 (Del. 1969) (merely stating that the release statute's
reference to danger relates to mental illness because a person who is only dangerous could
not be indeterminately confined in a mental hospital). See In re Lewis, 403 A.2d 1115,
1121 (Del. 1979) (citing the Mills footnote and dicta).
17 Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1983); State v. Mahone, 379 N.W.2d 878
(Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
" 722 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Harris v. Ballone, 681 F.2d 225 (4th Cir.
1982) (upholding Virginia law).
'Hickey, 722 F.2d at 548.
173 Id. at 549.
174 Id. at 546.
17 379 N.W.2d 878 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985).
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the NGRI acquittee was initially committed.'76 The court stated that the
maximum duration set by the Wisconsin statute precluded the evil sought
to be cured by the Jackson decision-namely, indefinite confinement."7
Consequently, the court rejected the constitutional challenges to the
Wisconsin release statute. Similarly, m State v. Perez,"" the Louisiana
Supreme Court upheld the very statute at question m Foucha. The court
noted that "[w]hen the crime is a serious one , a court should be
especially cautious before releasing an insanity acquittee."'79 The court
held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the
defendant had not met the burden of proving that he could be released
without danger to himself or others.'
The Louisiana Supreme Court relied on the above cases m upholding
Louisiana's "dangerousness" test in State v. Foucha."' Noting that due
process is a flexible standard, the court examined the purpose behind the
acquittee's original commitment. 2 Relying on O'Connor v. Donaldson"s3
for the proposition that "[t]here can be little doubt that in the exercise of its
police power a State may confine individuals solely to protect society from
the dangers of significant antisocial acts,"" the court held that the
"dangerousness" test satisfied due process.'85 This decision was, however,
reversed by the Supreme Court in Foucha v. Louisiana.'
The question that remains following the Foucha decision is whether the
"dangerousness" test is always unconstitutional in light of the Supreme
Court's decision and, if so, why? The majority of the Court in Foucha
dedicated a long portion of its opinion to distinguishing Louisiana's statutory
scheme from the pretrial detention of dangerous arrestees that the Court
upheld in United States v. Salerno.' In Salerno, the petitioner had
'76 Id. at 884 n.4.
1n See t, at 884.
" 563 So. 2d 841 (La. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2320 (1992). Justices
Blackmun, O'Connor, and Souter would have granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and
remanded to the Loumana Supreme Court m light of their decmon mFoucha. Perez, 112
S. Ct. at 2320.
'79 Perez, 563 So. 2d at 845.
'go Id.
". Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138 (La. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
182 See id at 1144.
83 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
184 Foucha, 563 So. 2d at 1144 (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-
83 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
185 Id.
116 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1789 (1992).
1s7 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
[Vol 82
CONTINUED CONFINEMENT
challenged portions of the Bail Reform Act of 1984,"s which allows
for courts to detain, prior to trial, arrestees charged with serious
felonies if the government demonstrates that no release conditions
would "reasonably assure... the safety of any other person and the
community.""' The Foucha Court held that Salerno had no
application to the confinement of NGRI acquittees because the
provisions of the Bail Reform Act are narrowly focused on an acute
problem and provide for a strictly limited duration of
confinement."9 In addition, the Bail Reform Act contains many
procedural safeguards, such as placing the burden on the Government
to prove the defendant's dangerousness by "clear and convincing"
evidence."' In contrast, the Louisiana statute provided for a potentially
"indefinite' confinement and was only "a step away" from substituting
confinement with the incarceration of those who have been proven to
have committed a crime.'"
The Court's analysis of the applicability of Salerno to the confinement
of NGRI acquittees is flawed for two reasons. First Louisiana's statutory
scheme provides for a release hearing six months after initial
commitment, every year thereafter at the request of the acquittee, and at
any time upon the request of the facility superintendent." Thus, it
provides for "indefinite" confinement only to the extent that the NGRI
acquittee is unable to satisfy the standards for release." Second,
Louisiana's dual plea of "not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity"
does indicate that the defendant has committed all elements of the crime
"beyond a reasonable doubt;"'95 he or she is merely exempt from
criminal responsibility because of his or her mental state at the time of the
offense. Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, stated that it may be
permissible to confine an NGRI acquittee who has regained his or her sanity
if the nature and duration of detention is "tailored to reflect pressing public
safety concerns related to the acquitteeb continuing dangerousness:"'
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. 11 1992).
"
9 Id.
t See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1787.
" 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f (Supp. m 1992).
"2 See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1787.
' See LA. CODE CPUM. PROC. ANN. arts. 655-656 (West Supp. 1991).
' Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1808 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
State v. Clark, 305 So. 2d 457, 461 (La. 1974). See generally Philips, supra note
28, at 1172 ("Mhe conditions for return of [a NGRI] verdict are conjunctive. For this
verdict to be proper, the trier of fact must find the defendant 'guilty'of the charge beyond
a reasonable doubt, and then find him 'legally insane' so as to excuse his conduct.").
'-" Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Although it is not expressly stated, a close reading of the majority
opinion seems to yield this same conclusion.'97
Thus, it would appear that under some circumstances, a state could
confine an NGRI acquittee based on "dangerousness" alone if the statute
provided for a limited duration of confinement. Such a narrow
construction might be applicable to "maximum duration" statutes like that
in Washington. The Washington statute provides that "such commitment
... cannot exceed the maximum possible penal sentence for any offense
charged for which [the person] was acquitted by reason of insanity.''
98
If the acquittee is still mentally ill and in need of treatment when he or
she has been confined for a time period equal to the maximum possible
penal sentence, the state may institute civil commitment proceedings.' "
Such "maximum duration" statutes strike a balance between the need of
the state to protect society from dangerous individuals whom the court
has found to have committed criminal acts and the due process rights of
the NGRI acquittee who may no longer be mentally ill. These statutes
also reflect a reasonable judgment on the part of state legislatures that
there is a definite relationship between dangerous behavior and mental
illness' and that persons found NGRI may need to be confined for the
protection of society. Although the Court did not expressly distinguish
between "maximum duration!' statutes and those statutes that do not limit
the duration of confinement, "maximum duration!' statutes should
withstand the majority's analysis in Foucha in that under such statutory
schemes an NGRI acquittee could not be confined longer than the
maximum hypothetical prison term for the crime charged.20'
' See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786-87.
'n WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020(3) (1989).
Id. New Jersey and Wisconsin have similar statutes-continued confinement based
on "dangerousness" alone, limited by the NGRI acquittee's hypothetical prison sentence.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-8(b)(3) (West 1982) ("The defendant's continued commitment
under the law governing civil commitment, shall be established by a preponderance of the
evidence, during the maximum period of imprisonment that could have been imposed...
for any charge on which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity."); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 971.17(1) (West Supp. 1992) ("ITihe court shall commit the person... for
a specified period not exceeding two-thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment that
could be imposed .... If the maximum term of imprisonment is life, the commitment
period specified by the court may be life."). Other states also provide for such maximum
duration of confinement based on the acquittee's hypothetical prison sentence, but, in
addition, require a showing of present mental illness. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
12.47.090(d) (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.5(a) (West Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT.,
cb. 38, 1005-2-4(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); OR. REv. STAT. § 161.327(1) (1991).
See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983).
" At least one commentator has proposed the use of '"maximum duration' statutes
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If the grave concern about the Louisiana statute was that it provided
for potentially indefinite detention without procedural due process for the
NGRI acquittee, "maximum duration" statutes like Washington's should
meet this objection. "Maximum duration' statutes guarantee that NGRI
acquittees will not be detained in mental institutions longer than the
maximum hypothetical prison term for the crime charged. Further, if the
Court does apply a "rational basis" test when evaluating equal protection
challenges to such statutes, judicial deference to the state legislatures that
drafted such statutes should suffice to uphold their constitutionality.2°
It is logical that an NGRI acquittee's dangerousness bears a "rational
basis" to the purpose for which he or she was originally committed.
"Maximum duration!' statutes should also meet the objections of the
remaining members of the Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor, in her
Foucha concurrence; specifically addressed these statutes by stating that
she did "not understand the Court's opinion to render such laws
necessarily invalid."2 3 Since Justice O'Connor's purpose in writing her
concurring opinion was to express that the Court was only striking down
this one narrow Louisiana statute," the pressing safety concerns
surrounding dangerous NGRI acquittees would likely compel her to
uphold such statutes. The Foucha dissenters would also uphold
"maximum duration!' statutes because such statutes reflect the distinction
between civil and criminal confinement and do not require the state to
renounce its interest in confining NGRI acquittees merely because they
have become "sane."2 5  The dissenters' willingness to uphold
Louisiana's statutory scheme on the facts before them indicates that they
would agree that "maximum duration" statutes comport with both due
process and equal protection requirements.
Three arguments, however, can be made against the constitutionality
of statutes that allow for the continued confinement of an NGRI acquittee
based on a finding of dangerousness alone, even though the maximum
duration of the acquittee's confinement is expressly limited. The first
to solve some of the procedural problems surrounding the NGRI acquittee's release. See
Greenwald, supra note 109, at 592.
C. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1120
(1985) (upholding Alabama statute which imposes a substantially lower gross premium
tax rate on domestic insurance companies than on out-of-state insurance companies); "In
the equal protection context ... if the State's purpose is found to be legitimate, the state
law stands as long as the burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that
purpose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish." 470 U.S. at 881.
Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1790 (1992) (O'Connor, 3., concurring).
See id at 1789.
2 See id. at 1801 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1993-941
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
argument is based on the difficulty that the NGRI acquittee would face in
proving at a release hearing that he or she is not dangerous?16 As a
practical matter, the acquittee has to prove a negative-that he or she is no
longer dangerous. Even if the acquittee is only subject to a preponderance of
the evidence standard, the burden on the acquittee to prove the absence of
"danger to self or others" may be an extremely difficult one to meet.
However, to use this argument to strike down the "dangerousness" standard
in every situation would be a mistake. It is just as difficult for the state to
prove "dangerousness" as it is for the acquittee to prove his
"nondangerousniess." Thus, this argument is primarily against the burden of
prool rather than against the "dangerousness" standard itself. This potential
problem could be eliminated by placing the burden on the state to prove
"dangerousness" once it has been determined that the NGRI acquittee is no
longer insane.
A second argument against statutes like that of Washington is that they
allow for continued confinement of a "sane?' NGRI acquittee to a mental
health institution. Some might argue that such acquittees should be removed
from mental health institutions and transferred to minimum security prisons.
The basis of such an argument is that remaining in a mental health institution
"stigmatizes" the acquittee as an insane person.2 7 As a general rule, the
Due Process Clause requires no procedural protections when a prison inmate
is transferred from one prison to another within the same state, even if from
a medium security to a maximum security prison.08 However, problems
See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("[D]angerousness
is a many splendored thing.... Moreover, once a man has shown himself to be
dangerous, it is all but impossible for him to prove the negative that he is no longer a
menace.'). For a good analysis of the difficulties for the NGRI acquittee of proving his
nondangerousness, see generally Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Dangerousness andMental
illness-Some Observations On The Decision To Release Persons Acquitted By Reason Of
Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225 (1960).
" But see Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 367 n.16 (1983), in which the Court
noted: "A criminal defendant who successfully raises the insanity defense necessarily is
stigmatized by the verdict itself, and thus the commitment causes little additional harm
in this respect."
The court in Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976)
stated
Confinement in any of the State's institutions is within the normal limits or
range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose. That
life in one prison is much more disagreeable than in another does not in itself
signify that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is implicated when a
prisoner is transferred to the institution with the more severe rules.
Id. at 225; see also Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (upholding a transfer to
administrative segregation which occurred without a formal evidentiary hearing). But cf.
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could result in transferring the sane NGRI acquittee to a prison, even if
only a minimum security prison.
In many jurisdictions where insanity is treated as an affirmative
defense, once the defendant puts forth evidence of insanity, the burden
shifts to the government to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.2
Thus, a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity indicates that the
government has failed to prove all elements of the offense by not proving
mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt. In this situation, a transfer of the
NGRI acquittee who has regained his or her sanity would surely violate
the Due Process Clause, as the acquittee is truly "not guilty" by reason
of insanity. In jurisdictions such as Louisiana, on the other hand, where
the dual plea places the burden on the defendant to prove his or her
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence,"' the NGRI acquittee is
found beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed the act. He or she
is exempt from criminal responsibility merely because of his or her
mental state at the time of the offense. 1 Therefore, transferring the
sane NGRI acquittee to a penal institution does not create the same due
process problems in jurisdictions with a dual plea as it does in
jurisdictions in which insanity is treated as an affirmative defense."
The third and. final argument against the constitutionality of
"maximum duration" statutes like that in Washington is that they make
provisions for what the Court in Jones v. United States said was not
required by due process. Although the Jones Court felt that the length of
the acquittee's hypothetical prison sentence was irrelevant to the purpose
of his or her initial commitment, "maximum duration!' statutes
require that at the end of the NGRI acquittee's hypothetical prison
sentence, the state either release the acquittee or subject him or her to
civil commitment proceedings. However, in light of the Court's belief in
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (holding that involuntary transfer of a prisoner to a
state mental institution implicates a liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process
Clause; therefore, procedural protections are required).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Samuels, 801 F.2d 1052 (8th Cir. 1986) (Missouri law);
Hall v. State, 568 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1990) (Florida law); Roundtree v. State, 568 So. 2d
1173 (Miss. 1990) (Mississippi law); State v. Smith, 379 S.E.2d 287 (S.C. 1989) (South
Carolina law); State v. Massey, 359 S.E.2d 865 (W. Va. 1987) (West Virginia law).
2' LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 652 (West 1993).
no See, e.g., State v. Fletcher, 717 P.2d 866 (Ariz. 1986) (Arizona law); Wilson v.
State, 359 S.E.2d 891 (Ga. 1987) (Georgia law); State v. Davis, 361 S.E.2d 724 (N.C.
1987) (North Carolina law).
' A fimdamental premise of this Note, however, is that such a transfer is not
constitutionally required.
20 Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983).
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Foucha that there is not a sufficient distinction for equal protection
purposes between the "sane" NGRI acquittee and the criminal defendant
who cannot prove that he or she is no longer dangerous," 4 it is unclear
whether the Court would now reach the same conclusion as it did in
Jones if a similar case came before it. Further, when such a provision has
been expressly provided for by a state legislature, it should survive a
constitutional challenge, whether the reviewing standard is "rational
basis" or "heightened scrutiny."'215 Indeed, it would seem anomalous if
a state were free to abolish the insanity defense entirely (thus allowing a
finding of guilt and the incarceration of an insane defendant), while it
could not confine a dangerous NGRI acquittee for the duration of his
hypothetical maximum sentence.
On the other hand, the constitutional status of the six other state
statutes that provide for potentially "indefinite" confinement of the NGRI
acquittee based on "dangerousness" alone2 6 is unclear. This is
especially true considering that the defendant in Foucha did not prove
that he was not a "dangerous" individual.2 7 Since this did not appear
to be a consideration in the Court's analysis of the constitutionality of the
Louisiana statute, the likely conclusion is that these other statutes are
currently unconstitutional as violative of the Due Process Clause.
CONCLUSION
In dealing with an area of the law that has always been controversial,
the Supreme Court in Foucha v. Louisiana struck down a Louisiana
statute that provided for continued confinement of a "sane!' NGRI
,, See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1788 (1992).
'sSee cases cited supra note 202.
z See the statutes from Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, and North
Carolina, respectively, cited supra note 169.
7 See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1782-83; id. at 1797 (Kennedy, ., dissenting); State v.
Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138, 1141 (La. 1990), revd, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
" In one of the first cases since Foucha concerning a statute providing for indefinite
confinement based on the sole finding of "dangerousness," the Kansas Court of Appeals
held KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(3) (Supp. 1991), to be unconstitutional. In re Noel, 838
P.2d 336 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992). Specifically, the court held.
The current statutory scheme used to determine the need for continued
commitment of insanity acquittees violates the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment by not placing the burden of proof
upon the State to show by clear and convincing evidence both the committed
person's continued insanity and dangerousness. As required by Foucha v.
Louisiana, we engraft such requirements into the Kansas statutory scheme.
Id. at 345 (emphasis added).
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acquittee based on his "dangerousness" to society and himself. By
undertaking a complete turnaround in its analysis of the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses and conflating the differences between civil and
criminal confinement the Court has left the law surrounding mental
health confinement in a state of confusion. Until the Court makes a
clearer pronouncement, issues such as the appropriate standard of review
to be applied in mental health confinement cases where there are equal
protection and/or due process challenges and the continued vitality of the
Jones decision will remain unanswered.
Statutes based on "dangerousness" alone that have a maximum
confinement duration based on the acquittee's hypothetical prison sentence
appear to be constitutional. Such statutes take into consideration the
genuine differences that exist between criminal and civil committees and
recognize that the defendant found "not guilty by reason of insanity" has
committed a criminal act, but is merely exempt from criminal
responsibility due to his or her mental state at the time of the offense.
Further, these statutes recognize the strong state interest in protecting
society from dangerous individuals who have committed criminal acts.
If Foucha is limited solely to its facts, statutes like that in
Washington 2  should remain constitutional, especially if a "rational
basis" standard of review is applied, whereas statutes providing for
"indefinite" confinement based on "dangerousness" alone, like that in
Delaware' 0 and Iowa, 21 are not likely to survive equal protection or
due process challenges.' However, if the Foucha case is given broad
constitutional significance, an anomaly will result. According to Jones,
anNGRI acquittee maybe confined "indefinitely" regardless of the nature
or seriousness of his offense as long as he remains "insane" in the legal
sense of the term.' On the other hand, according to Foucha, a
dangerous NGRI acquittee who has committed a serious crime is allowed
to go free at any time, once he can show that he is no longer mentally
ill' 4 Until the Supreme Court makes a clear pronouncement in this
2 WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020(3) (1989).
w DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 403(b) (1987).
2 IOWA R. CRIM. P. 21.8(e) (West 1992).
22 See supra notes 83-166 and accompanying text.
2' See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983) ("The length of the
acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his
commitment:).
2 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1808 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("If the
Constitution did not require a cap on the acquittee's confinement in Jones, why does it
require one here?').
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area, this anomaly will persist, leaving unanswered the question: What is
the states' right to confine an NGRI acquittee?
David S. Wisz
